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Abstract: Despite the results of the Crimean War and the Paris Peace Treaty
(1856), British influence in the Principality of Serbia could not have been
extended to the point of competing with that of Russia. British consuls soon
perceived that the activity of Russian agents was aimed to gradually under-
mine the 1856 Treaty and disturb Turkey. Neither Fonblanque, nor Lytton
or Longworth were diplomatically weighty enough to impede Russian in-
fluence.
The Crimean War was longer in duration and bloodier than soli-
tary Russia and her four adversaries had expected. The persistence of
each side to end the war by inflicting military or diplomatic defeat on
the adversary prolonged the war for three years. Finally, after the allies
proved themselves superior, the parties to the war sat at a negotiating
table in Paris, or. February 25, 1856. A peace treaty was concluded on
March 30, 1856. Only those less informed could have thought that the
Principality of Serbia would became involved in the war. Russia first
advised Serbia to stand aside, only to ask her afterwards to Join. The
movements of Austrian troops toward the Sava and Danube rivers
posed an open threat to Serbia. France and Great Britain tried to draw
her in on their side, but were nonetheless content with her non-interfer-
ence. Even if there had been no external pressures, internal circum-
stances in Serbia and her unpreparedness for war were such that war
could be conceived only in the event that Serbia herself was assaulted.
However, considering that the Principality of Serbia was still a
vassal of Turkey and that Paris strove to avoid any reason for fresh
conflict, Articles 28 and 29 of the Paris Peace Treaty stipulated the po-
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sition of the Principality of Serbia. According to Article 28, Serbia re-
mained a vassal state with the recognition of "son administration
independente et nationale, ainsi que la pleine liberte de culte, de legis-
lation, de commerce et de navigation". The next article stipulated that
Turkish garrisons were to remain deployed in Serbian forts, but that no
armed intervention could be launched against Serbia without previous
agreement between the signatories to the Treaty.'
The then British consul general in the Principality of Serbia, the
elderly and not very able Thomas de Grenier de Fonblanque, was to
implement two chief tasks: to hinder everything that might shake Tur-
key and explore possibilities for the penetration of British capital. His
reports were frequent, though not providing as much information as
might have been expected of one who had spent fourteen years as con-
sul in Belgrade." His long-term service and the expenence of his coun-
try in affairs with Russia have taught him that Russia was a dangerous
and sinewy adversary. His reports on Russia's influence in Serbia
sometimes seem Russo-phobic, but then he often had reason to be. In
March 1856, Toma Vucic-Perisic requested from Vienna that the new
Russian consul general in Belgrade be received with such ceremony
that, as Fonblanque described, would be "too much for an Emperor on
his Passage after the conquest of Kingdoms"." On the arrival of the
new Russian consul general Colonel Milosevic, the hoisting of the
Russian consular flag was greeted among the populace with such joy,
and an unusual ceremony offering blessings to the flag. It was open de-
fiance toward Turkey." At the time, many young Serbs requested
scholarships from the Russian emperor to join Russian military acade-
mies' Substantiating his claim that the disposition of the Serbian peo-
ple toward Russia could not be weakened even by the Austrophil
policy of those who ruled Serbia," Fonblanque cabled the Foreign Of-
Noradounghian, Gabriel effendi. Recueil dactes intemationaux de I'Empire
Ottoman, IIIe tome 1856-1878, Paris 1902. 78.
2 Fonblanque was appointed consul in Serbia in the summer of 184 L he arrived in
Zemun in the spring of 1842, and moved into his residence in Belgrade 111 the
beginning of 1843 (Stevan K. Pavlowitch. Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia
1837-1839. The Mission ofColonel Hodges, Paris 1961, 182).
3 Fonblanque to Redcliffe (Stratford de Redcliffe). April 3 I, 1856, Belgrade,
Foreign Office (FO further in the text) 78/1197.
4 Fonblanque to Clarendon (George William Frederich Villiers. Earl of Clarendon),
October 30, 1856, Belgrade, FO 78/1198.
5 Fonblanque to Foreign Office. October 30. 1856, Belgrade FO 78/1198.
6 Fonblanque to Redcliffe, March 26,1856, Belgrade, FO 78/1197.
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fice that the Belgian ambassador to Istanbul, Blondell de Cuelbroeck,
on a brief visit to Belgrade, had said the Serbs were very disposed to-
ward Russia." Fonblanque correctly ascertained that Russia and Aus-
tria were battling for greater influence in Serbia. He thought it would
be better if Austrian influence prevailed, as it would be less detrimen-
tal. Though he scarcely believed this possible, despite the fact that
Russia could during its protectorate do more for the improvement of
Serbia's, position. Russia needed Serbia, Fonblanque accused, merely
to disturb and debilitate Turkey.f
The British consul was convinced that sympathies for Russia
were built on hatred toward Austria, admitting to being baffled over
why the pro-French stream had sunk into the pro-Russian. The new
Russian consul, Colonel Milosevic, did not leave the impression of a
capable diplomat, so his British counterpart inferred that the former
would not remain in Serbia for long. Fonblanque believed his mission
was to investigate the disposition of the Serbs toward the Russian gov-
emment and, till better times, to implement the policy of "agitation".
Milosevic himself contributed to this opinion. While saying that Serbs
were a specially good people, but dissatisfied, remaining quiet though
no one was forcing them to, he claimed, on the other hand, that the
Serbs would lose all their freedoms if they allowed foreign powers to
interfere. He was referring to a neglect of the provisions of the Paris
Treaty." It appears Fonblanque was surprised that so soon after peace
had been concluded, Russia dared to work on breaking it. So he has-
tened with his reports on Russia's propaganda that was inducing Serbia
to seek its future in direct Russo-Turkish negotiations. It was even
worse when three Russian officers of Serbian origin, in order to draw
to their Side Serbs who went to school in France, said "the South-Slavs
must look for rescue, quite as much towards Paris as to the more north-
em, and natural Direction". 10
7 Fonblanque to Foreign Office, November 28,1856, Belgrade, FO 78/1198.
8 Fonblanque to Redcliffe, April J2 and 25, July 16 and August 19,1856, Belgrade,
FO 78/1198.
9 Fonblanque to Clarendon, March 10. 1857, Belgrade, FO 78/1287. Consul
Fonblanque saw Russia as a dangerous adversary to his country but also
underestimated the Russians. He says in the same letter: "Mv belief in Russian
aptitude for civilisation is the same which I entertain of Negro capacity for
Abstract Mathematics: though I can claim to know more of Russian than of
coloured men ,. ~
10 Fonblanque to Clarendon, June 10 and 17, 1857, Belgrade FO N9RLRRS~
Fonblanque to Rcdcliffe, JLJ1e 11 and 21,1857, Belgrade, FO 78/1288.
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British reports from Belgrade contain no trace of the struggle be-
tween the Prince and Council. Perhaps Consul Fonblanque's superiors
in Istanbul and London did not request for such an analysis or he him-
self did not consider it important for his country's politics. However, in
June 1857, he wrote, not without reason, that both sons of Prince Alex-
ander where of such intellectual and physical capacity that neither
would be fit to rule, and named as many as seven candidates to the
throne: Stefan Stefanovic - Tenka, Aleksa Sirnic, Pavle Stanisic, Jovan
Ristic, Dimitrije Crnobarac, Konstantin Nikolajevic and Milivoje
Petrovic Blaznavac.l '
It appears Fonblanque was not very surprised when Tenka's con-
spiracy was foiled in October 1857 and many men at the top of Ser-
bia's political pyramid arrested. Most of the prisoners were inclined
toward Russia and hoped she would depose Prince Alexander and rein-
state Milos Obrenovic. As it was said openly in public that the men
were Russophiles, consul Milosevic protested against allegations that
the Russian government instigated the plan for the murder of Prince
Alexander. Acting on instructions received from the Foreign Office,
Fonblanque intervened with Prince Alexander, conveying hope from
his government that only those found guilty beyond doubt would be
convicted and warned that councillors cannot be punished before the
Porte was consulted. This was not a humanistic move by the British di-
plomacy. Britain was much concerned lest the convictions overfill the
glass of discontent among the Serbian opposition and disorders break
out on a broader scale. Moreso that Serbia should, in such a storm,
completely fall under Russia's influence, which Fonblanque indicated
might happen. 12
In early 1858, Fonblanque reported that Russia's influence in
Serbia was growing. Russia objected to any collective action by the
Great Powers in Serbia. Gradually, Prince Alexander was turning to-
ward Russia, probably, according to Fonblanque, because of Austria's
position regarding Serbia's rights in regulating navigation along the
Danube. Thus Fonblanque concluded it would be very useful ifEthem
Pasha's planned mission were carried out. Reconciling the quarrelling
sides in Serbia would not only calm down the situation, but develop a
II Fonblanque to Redcliffe, JW1e 21, 1857, Belgrade, FO 78/1288.
12 Fonblanque to Clarendon, October 9, 12 and 22, 1857, Belgrade, FO T8iN288~
Fonblanque to Redcliffe, October 16 and 22 and November 9, 1857, FO 78/556
and T8!l288~ Clarendon to Redcliffe, November II, 1857, FO 195/556.
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feeling of indebtness and gratitude within Serbia toward the Porte
With this, and certain reforms, Turkey might pull Serbia away from
Russia's influence and "interrupt the Pan-Slavistic Current to the
South-East and South-West of Belgrade". 13
Fonblanque wrote neither frequently nor in detail of Etem Pa-
sha's doings in Belgrade. Writing at the beginning of the year that he
had been, by the way, informed that the Turkish commissioner was to
work by his counsel, and, saying, at the end of the year, incidentally, in
a memoir, that he was the chief advisor to Ethem Pasha, would mean
he had considerable influence over or at least had consultations with
Ethem Pasha. 14
In the evening of May 26, 1858 Fonblanque was fiercely as-
saulted in Kalemegdan park by an Albanian working for the Turks. He
was lucky, as, two Belgrade students in the vicinity saved his life. Fear
of the Albanian aroused gratitude toward the Belgraders, the effica-
ciousness of the Badgastein or the talks he conducted in Munich, Vi-
enna, Pest or Constantinople, or all these together, affected Fonblanque
that he wrote several restrospective memoirs and reports with a realis-
tic view of the situation in and around Serbia. He saw Austria as the
chief foreign political cause of instability in Serbia which supported
Prince Alexander. On the opening of the St. Andrew's Assembly on
November 30, 1858 Fonblanque wrote from Constantinople that an in-
surrection could break out easily in Serbia if Prince Alexander re-
mained on the throne. He believed the danger far exceeded the
boundaries of Serbia. "To my conviction, there is no safety for the
Principle of Ottoman Territorial Integrity so long as Alexandar
Petrovits Kara-Gi urgevits is permitted to retain the Title of Prince of
Servia", wrote Fonblanque. If Turkey would oppose the return of the
Obrenovic dynasty and put up its own candidate, the Serbs, aided by
Russia, would tum against their suzerain. If an insurrection should
break out in Serbia, Austria would try to pacify It, and Russia would
surely become involved. That would mean, thought Fonblanque, the
breaking up of the European part of the Ottoman Empire owing to
13 Fonblanque to Clarendon, January 30 and February 5, 1858, Belgrade, FO
78/1376; Fonblanque to Alison (Charles Alison), February 24 and 25, and March
25, 1858, Belgrade, FO 7811376.
14 Fonblanque to Clarendon, February 5. 1858. Belgrade, FO T~ilPTS; Mr de
Fonblanques Memorandum on Mr Dalyells Correspondence from Belgrade and
of the Tendences of Servian Policy, December 14, 1858. Constantinople, FO
195/583.
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"miscalculations of the Sultan's Ally at Vienna", not on account of
Russia's intrigues, as the Vienna press claimed. IS The reversal in Fon-
blanque's interpretation of the crisis in Serbia and seeking the culprit
were obvious.
A brief period had elapsed since the return of Milos Obrenovic to
Serbia until Fonblanques initial negative assessments of Milos's per-
sonality and governing. Perhaps the second accession of Prince Milos
was directly or indirectly financially supported by Russia. However,
Fonblanque surely exaggerated when he said that Russia's supervision
and aid enabled Prince Milos to strive solely to reign with the scepter
of Tsar Dusan.l" Before his return to Serbia, Prince Milos had made
his intention clear to rule autocratically, as he did in his previous reign.
He was unable, during his entire second reign, to adjust to all the
changes that took place during his twenty-year absence. But he, too, as
many Romanians, Italians, Hungarians, and, of course, other Serbs,
strove toward one goal: the unification and independence of his people.
The Prince's irascible disposition became more prominent in the latter
years of his life, and the undiplomatic conduct of his affairs were not
infrequent. The fact that the obstinate Prince dismissed the Russian
consul from his first audience and that he terrified the pasha in Bel-
grade by stating that the only treaty was the one he himself recognized,
convinced even more the British consul that he had been correct in his
reports'? Namely, he believed that Prince Milos should be forced to
abdicate and leave Serbia. He should be succeeded by his son Mihailo
who would wisely channel Russian influence in Serbia and would not
be an instrument in the hands of Russia, like his father. 18
15 Fonblanque to Bulwer (Henry Lytton Bulwer), November 30, 1858,
Constantinople, FO 195/583.
16 Fonblanque to Malmesbury (James Howard Harris, 3rd Earl of Malmesbury),
March 3 L 1859, Belgrade, FO 78/1439.
17 Fonblanque to Malmesbury, April 15, 1859, Belgrade, FO 78/1439; Fonblanque
quoted Prince Milos as telling Osman Pasha: "...You allude to treaties! I could tell
vou what Treaties are to me. The valid Treaties are made bv myself - by my own
~nd single Willi" Fonblanque reported in August" ...even i"n a written Man"ifcsto.
sent to the Porte early in March last, Milosch denied being subject to any kind of
Control; Declared he would Govern according to his own Will, - and only vield to
Military Force when this should be proved more efficient than that which he
could oppose to it; - and, finallly prescribing I! I that any Foreign Representatives
who asked what his Intentions were'? - might be furnished with Copies of the
Declaratory-Act then transmitted." Fonblanque to Bulwer, August 3, 1859,
Vienna, FO 78/1440.
18 Fonblanque to Bulwer, April 15, 1859, Belgrade, FO 195/651; Letter cited dates
August 3, 1859.
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The fact that Fonblanque was erroneous in his assessments is his
claim that he, of all the consuls, was best informed about the develop-
ments in the Assembly of the Virgin Mary's Nativity. During the As-
sembly's session in Kragujevac, where a foreigner was permitted to
stay only 24 hours, under strict police supervision, Fonblanque was
most interested in: the extent of Russia's influence, changing Art. 17 of
the 1838 Constitution19 and establishing the right of succession for the
Obrenovic family. Fonblanque believed that Russian propaganda in the
European provinces of the Ottoman Empire had become strongly influ-
ential, leading rapidly to a conflict between the Slavic population in
the Empire and the Porte. He described Russian politics in the Balkans:
"I think Russia's objects on this reference will be satisfied with less
trouble and at a smaller cost after the first disruption in Turkey, - with
the Prestige she is quite sure of in such a Physical-Force Kingdom of
Grand-Duchy of Servia - with a ruder (but still Popular) kind of Feder-
alism in Bosnia and Bulgaria, and all which would increase her Faculty
of Regulating a fine balance-wheel amongst the lax Governing Classes
in Moldavia and Wallachia, where there is only a remote likelihood of
the People ever asserting itself or counting for anything beyond unwill-
ing Production - in the Institutions" .20 When the legislation on succes-
sion was promulgated, Fonblanque sent a translation of the document
to Russell, stressing that its illegalities rendered analysis impossible-"
Fonblanques reports proved not only that he was not the most
well-informed consul of the developments in Kragujevac, but that the
Russian consul Milosevic was In Kragujevac, and had allegedly pre-
vented the proclamation of Pnnce Milos as dictator and considerably
influenced the work of the Assembly. On the last day of 1859, Fon-
blanque wrote there would be no crisis in Serbia unless the Prince
died. Even then, Russia was contemplating another candidate for Ser-
bia' . I h T)ia s pnnce y t rone.r-
19 Fonblanque [(1 l\..usscll (John Russell), September 27 and October 13. 1859.
Belgrade. FO 78/1440. Article 17 of the Constitution reads: "The 17 members of
the Council will not be dismissed without a reason, until it was proved by the
sublime Porte. that they had committed a violation of the law and national
decrees". From YCUW6U K,Wif{CGlIliC U KpaJbC6I1Hf' Cp6u/eI835-1903. CAHY
Onen.en,e .TJ;PYUITBCffiIX HayK3. M3BOPI1 cpncxor npaaa VII. Eeorpan 1988, 72. An
amendment to this article could have altered the balance 01 forces in Serbia to the
advantage of the Prince which would have caused much discontent in Turkey and
Russia, and, in view of possible consequences, the other guarantee powers.
20 Fonblanque to Russc]], Uctober U, !S59 Belgrade. ro T8il4i~~F
21 Fonblanque to Russeli. November 21, N~R9. Belgrade. FO 78/HAO
22 Fonblanque to Foreign Office. December 30. N~R9. Belgrade. FO 78/1440
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Toward the end of 1859, Fonblanque was seriously taken ill.
Some said it was because of the beating he got in Kalemegdan park.
As he was bedridden, a new man was charged with conducting affairs
at the British consulate in Belgrade. Lytton's reports as of February 19,
1860, showed he had a tum for analysis.
Several of his reports gave clear indications of preparations for
an Insurrection against the Turkish authorities in the Turkish provinces
around Serbia. Lytton inferred that an insurrection was looming and
that Turkey was endeavoring to prevent it. He saw two sources of dan-
ger. The first was the plainly visible discontent among the population,
though it was too late to determine the causes. The second source of
danger composed two parts: the politics of Pnnce Milos and, Russian
politics. Prince Milos could chose whether to be vassal to a weak Tur-
key or to be under the cap of a strong Russia. There were several rea-
sons why Lytton believed Milos would remain neutral. First he
refused several addresses of dissatisfied Christians from the neighbor-
ing provinces. Second, the Prince was old, and naturally would want to
spend his declining years in peace. Third, and most important, was the
Prince's experience with Russia, which taught him "that the ambition
of that Power is incompatible with his own". The Prince was intimi-
dated by this and did not want Turkey disintegrated. Nonetheless, if an
insurrection should break out the Prince would be compelled to decide
whether to lead it or let it ride by events. He would not hesitate to lead
the insurrection, thought Lytton, but would sooner reach his aim
"through fear of an insurrection, then by insurrection itself". Russia de-
sired that the dissatisfied population rebel, do as much as it can with its
own forces, and finally be liberated with Russia's assistance. Thus Lyt-
ton formulated Russia's policy in the words of her agents in Serbia:
"The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire must come from within and
not from without. Let us therefore encourage insurrection and ensure
its success'i.P Considering it his duty to depict the situation in Serbia
before leaving Belgrade, Lytton compiled an extensive report, with a
more penetrating analysis. At a time when Prince Milos was prepanng
a deputation to Constantinople charged with setting specific demands,
and when news of national fermentation in Europe inebriated the Bal-
kan leaders, Lytton did not find it difficult to formulate and expound
on four problems pertaining to Serbia that might shake Turkey: Turks
23 Lytton to Bu1wer, February 19, 1860, Belgrade, FO 195/651.
Serbo - Russian Relations (1856-1862) 107
in Serbia in and around fortresses, a change of the 1838 Constitution,
succession of the princely dignity, and, what seemed most crucial, pos-
sibile insurrection in the neighboring Turkish provinces. Lytton was
informed that Russia was not sending arms to Serbia but was, however,
sending large sums of money. In the analysis, Lytton was more acute
in his assessments of the Prince's activities when he claimed that the
Prince was encouraging movements in neighboring provinces to win
certain concessions from an intimidated Turkey.I"
Lytton stayed on in Belgrade to see to the burial of his senior col-
league and await the newly appointed consul Longworth. Longworth
fell to work vigorously on reading the archives of his predecessors,
and, analyzing the situation more wisely than Lytton, inferred that the
Russian Prince Dolgoruky arrived in Belgrade in February 1860 not to
stir up hopes for an insurrection, but to curb passions among the insur-
gents and within the Prince's milieu. 25
The new British consul did not have the opportunity to become
better acquainted with Prince Milos, who, old and ill, only received the
Russian consul. So Longworth had talks with prince Mihailo who said
he did not believe Serbia would have any advantages from a new war
between Russia and Turkey, adding, "Je sais bien que ce nest pas pour
nos beaux yeux que la Russie fera la guerre a la Turquie". Although he
did not trust prince Mihailo, Longworth was happy to hear this.26 The
further development of events led Longworth to think now that the
Prince was inclined toward Russia, then to believe that he was unable
to resist the strong pro-Russian party. A group of Turks murdered on
the coast of the Sava River beneath the fortress of Belgrade, then, an
increasing number of refugees, particularly from Bulgarian regions, in-
termittent skirmishes on the border with Turkey and Aksakov's pan-
Slavic propaganda, convinced Longsworth that the Serbian police was
controlled by Milosevic. He even thought investigation would yield
evidence showing Milosevics Involvement III the murders on the Sava
coast.27
Longworth was very unhappy over prince Mihailo' s growing
compliance with the Russian party. He felt the pro-Russian stream in-
24 Lytton to Bulwer, March 19, 1860, Belgrade, FO 195/651
25 Longworth to Russell, AprillO, 1860, Belgrade, FO 78/1515.
26 Longworth to Bulwer and Russel, May 23, 1860, Belgrade, FO 78/1515.
27 Longworth to 'J, June 28, 1860, Belgrade, FO 78/1515; Longworth to Bulwer,
August 2 and 9, 1860, Belgrade, FO 78/1515; Longworth to Russell. August 27,
1860, Belgrade, FO 78/1515.
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tensify because he could not come by information unless he paid for it.
However, a report that prince Mihailo had received instructions from
Britain's ambassador to Constantinople Henry Bulwer in September
1860 and said that Bulwers counsels were in accordance with his
views, was a ray of hope. Longworth thus thought prince Mihailo
"may perhaps wish to moderate the action of the Russian party without
venturing to come to an open rupture with them".28 When prince Mi-
hailo strove to consolidate power immediately after his father's death,
Longworth reported that the question of the succession was not so im-
portant that the Porte should not yield, and recognize prince Mihailo
succession to the throne, to pacify the situation in and around Serbia-"
When Prince Mihailo formed the new government, Longworth gained
the impression that he had turned his back slightly on Russia. Long-
worth seems to have believed that the new Prince was not at home in
the existing set of circumstances, "I fear that a good deal of what was
merely ambiguous in his conduct may be now more unfavorably char-
acterized. It would seem as ifhe had been tampering with all parties; to
the Russian, though avoiding a rupture, his attitude has been reserved,
while towards the Porte it has been by turns forward and conciliatory:
baffled however in this double game he has now recourse to her adver-
saries who if I am not deceived must as consequence of their own
maneouvers have anticipated and been waiting for his ovcrtures.F'
In December, 1860, Longworth could not learn what the state ad-
visor, Jovan Marinovic, would attempt to procure by visiting European
courts. He could only presume that he would try to win support for
Serbia's demands sent to the Porte - primarily, recognition for succes-
sion to the princely thronel! At the close of January, 1861, Longworth
had reason to believe that Jovan Marinovic had failed to obtain what
he had hoped for in St. Petersburg. Nevertheless, influence of the Rus-
sian party increased, and its leaders, Stevca Mihaj lovic and Metropoli-
tan Mihailo, were instruments of the Russian consul general. At his
instructions, a large number of emissaries had left Belgrade to collect
information and incite the dissatisfied population in Bosnia, Bulgaria
and Albania.V So, mildly speaking, it was unusual that the new Rus-
28 Longworth to Bulwer, September 19,1860, Belgrade, FO 78il5l5.
29 Longworth to Russell, October 22, 1860, Belgrade, FO 78/1515; Ibid - Bulwer,
November 16 and December 3, 1860, Belgrade, FO 78/1515/
30 Letter from December 3, 1860.
31 Ibid; Longworth to Russel, December 6, 1860, Belgrade, FO 78/1515.
32 Longworth to Bulwer, January 29, 1861, Belgrade FO 78/1585.
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sian consul, Vlangaly, expressed to Longworth "his surprise that peo-
ple should imagine there was such a thing as a Russian party here; and
what was still more amusing" continued Longworth in his report, "he
said a Servian warned him against too freely communicating with an-
other Servian because he did not belong to that party. The fact is that
Mr Vlangaly rather overdoes the part of a passive observer of events
which he has probably been instructed to assume; that of a too zealous
agitator played by his predecessor having in some degree compro-
mised his government". 33 At the same time, Longworth began to sus-
pect that the Russia's and Austria's policies toward Serbia were
coming closer to each other. He became convinced of this when Aus-
tria permitted Serbia to import arms when there were sure signs that a
movement for national liberation was strengthening in Serbiar'
The advent of spring brought on more problems. Refugees, flee-
ing mostly across the eastern border of Serbia, were becoming a press-
ing problem. In June, 1861, Prince Mihailo complained to Longworth
that Russia, by driving out Tatars from the Crimea and filling in the
void with Bulgarians, was solving its own problems and adhering to its
policy of undermining Turkey from within. The fact that this caused
trouble for Serbia, Russia did not mind. This further put off Prince Mi-
hailo from Russian policy. When he realized that the preparedness of
his army was far below the necessary standard, he tried to establish or-
der on Serbia's borders and suppress the agitation of Russian agents. 35
Longworth was wrong when he wrote that the so-called "Russian
party" had subsided before the convening of the Assembly of Trans-
figurationt" After the Assembly closed, he reported that the stream
Vlangaly referred to as the "democratic party" in the Assembly, had
emerged as the only opposition to the Prince's illegal measures. Ana-
lyzing the causes of conflict between the "Russian party" and Prince
Mihailo, Longworth said rumor had it in Belgrade that Russia was
willing to support a fureign candidate to the Serbian throne. Moreso,
33 Longworth to Bulwer. February 18, 1861, Belgrade FO 78/1585.
34 Ibid: Initial news of this date from November 1860 and in Februarv 1861
Longworth has the information that France and Russia agree that Austria 'occuPY
Bosnia (Longworth - Bulwer, November L 1860, Zemun, FO 195/651:
Longoworth to Foreign Office. February 19,1861, Belgrade, FO N9RLS8S~
Longworth to Rus:elL Mayi I. 1~EI I. Belgrade, FO 78/1585.
35 Longworth to Bulwer, .Tullc 25, 1861, Belgrade, FO DT~LN 585.
36 Longworth to Bulwer, August 3.1861 Belgrade. FO 781l585.
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he learned that the "Russian party" and friends of the former prince,
Alexander Karadjordjevic, were hatching a conspiracy.:'?
Longworth underscored more than once that the decisions
adopted by the Transfiguration Assembly were contrary to Turkey's
international obligations, which were, of course, binding for Serbia.
The best and least perilous, thought Longworth, would have been if the
prince had respected his commitment and unreservedly placed himself
under the protection of the Porte. But, said Longworth, "he had pre-
ferred however being a vassal of Russia or of France who alternately
and by agreement, it would appear, dictate the program of the meas-
ures to be pursued here". It seemed then that a new threat had emerged
for Britain's policy of calming the situation in Serbia. French colonel
Hipolit Mondain had been appointed army minister.V
Longworth and Conrad Vasic, the Austrian charge d' affaires.
were instructed by their governments to submit a memorandum to the
Prince, which they did, at the end of 1861, protesting the unlawful de-
cisions of the Transfiguration Assembly. In talks with Prince Mihailo
and Ilij a Garasanin, Longworth asserted that they knew their argu-
ments were not irrefutable. But the support they had, Longworth was
sure, from Russia and France, enabled them to abide by their deci-
sions.I? At the instructions of his superior from Constantinople, Sir
Henry Bulwer, Longworth reiterated Britain's warnings to Ilija
Garasanin and Prince Mihailo. Garasanin attached importance to a re-
organization of the national army, insisting it was imperative to Serbia
because of the developments in her vicinity. During talks with Prince
Mihail0, Longworth noticed that the national army in itself posed a
threat as Serbia had no resources to arm, clothe, feed or pay it, thus
such a situation might be taken advantage of. "His Highness could not
fail to perceive that my observation applied more particularly to the
Russian party to whose plots and intrigues he is aware I (Longworth,
Lj .R) have always given him credit for opposing some resistance. It
must at the same time served as a hint if the idea had not before oc-
cured to him that the ready acquiescence of Russia in the militia
scheme though a ground of additional confidence as regards the Porte,
37 Longworth to Bulwer, September 16, 1861, Belgrade, FO 7811585.
38 Longworth to Bulwer, October 28 and 30, 1861, Belgrade, FO 7811720 and FO
195/686.
39 Longworth to?, January 4, 1862, Longworth to Russell, January 25, 1862,
Belgrade FO 7811672.
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must justify alarm as to her own designs in connection with it", said
Longworth, mferring that the Prince was still undecided on the ques-
tion of the national army.i"
Having established that the organization of the Serbian army was
part of a preparation to destroy and divide the Ottoman Empire,
Russell proposed to Austria a new joint step. In keeping with this,
Longworth received instructions from the Foreign Office in April
1862, to point out to Prince Mihailo, at every convenient moment, that
internal administration in Serbia was in fact independent and that a
Russian yoke would be more fierce than the nominal tax Serbia was
paying in the form of putting up with a single garrison deployed in
Belgrade."! As other big powers did not join Austria and Britian in
their protest, the Serbian government had no need to yield to the pres-
sure.
At the end of the month, Longworth informed that the Prince's
emissary Milan Petronijevic had returned from St. Petersburg. Al-
though his informer was unsuccessful in learning the details of the mis-
sion, Longsworth thought he had correctly assumed its obj ective.
Prince Mihailo had endeavored so to free himself from the "Russian
party", that he had, thought Longworth, nearly ruptured relations with
the Russian government. Petronijevic was charged with amending this.
He then had to ascertain whether Serbia had Russia's support, should
events in Bosnia-Herzegovina take a more favorable turn, in demand-
ing from the Porte the administration of Bosnia. This would, of course,
require Russia's backing in money and arms. Petronijevic, Longworth
had learned, had received promise for financial and political support,
but was reprimanded for the Prince's casual attitude toward the belli-
cose Orthodox population in the neighboring provinces.F In fact, al-
though promising a loan and the sale of a large number of old guns, the
Russian government had advised a moderate policy.
Several days before Belgrade was bombed from the Turkish fort,
Longworth had noticed an unusual vivacity in the Russian consulate
after Vlangaly's return from Vienna.i' The bombardment had pre-
vented him from learning more about it.
40 Longworth to Bulwer, March 17, m~d2 Belgrade, FO 7R!l672.
41 Foreign OtTicc t\· Longworth. April g, ]R62, London, FO n!l67].
42 Longworth to Bulwcr. l\.pli126. 1862.. Belgrade, FO 7S/1672.
43 Longworth to Bulwcr..June I L 1862, Belgrade, FO 78/1672.
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Pursuing humanistic goals rather than performing a diplomatic
task, or, perhaps, overcome by an injured vanity because the Austrian
consul Vasic had gone to the Belgrade fort unsolicited, and, allegedly,
affected an end to the bombing, Longworth cooperated more with
Vlangaly and the French consul Tastu at the beginning of diplomatic
activities to pacify the hostilities. As a doyen of the Belgrade consu-
lary corps, Longworth believed that Vasics stay in the fort during the
bombardment should be condemned. But he quickly changed his mind.
He received a severe rebuff from Constantinople to the effect that Brit-
ain's policy "generally agrees better with that of Austria in Servia than
with that of any other Power" and to cooperate with Vasic. When they
realized that "the Servians, backed by the French and Russian, are be-
coming quite unreasonable", Longworth's superiors believed it was be-
cause their consul "went too much with France and Russia against
Austria". As he received clear instructions and realized his position as
consul was shaky, Longworth apologized for the error but could not
conceal his anger and resentment.i" He continued to report fervently
on the developments in Belgrade, but to the end of the Kanlyja confer-
ence, mentioned neither Vlangaly nor the Russian party. Only once he
reported that a certain Major Djordjevic had arrived from Russia and
was immediately appointed chief commander of the Serbian army.
Longworth saw 1Il Djordjevic a Russian Mondain in Serbia and under-
scored it might jeopardize a peaceful solution to the problem."
The conference of the ambassadors of the Grait Powers on the
Serbian question commenced on July 22, 1862, in the summer resort of
Fuad Pasha in the Constantinople suburb of Kanlyja. Britain's ambas-
sador Bulwer sometimes advocated Turkish interests more vehemently
than the Turkish ambassador himself. He was backed by the Austrian
internuncio Osten-Prokesch. Serbian interests were truculently repre-
sented by French Marquis de Moustier. Russian ambassador Lobanov-
Rostovsky supported Moustiers proposals but not as Serbia expected
from a Russian deputy. The Italian ambassador, Marquis Caracciolo,
44 Bulwer to Russell, June 21. 1862, Constantinople. Correspondence relatmg to the
Bombardment of Belgrade in June 1862, (Further: Correspondence.. ) FO 421:
Longworth to Bulwer, June 22. 1862, Belgrade, FO T8LNST2~ Bu1wer to RusselL
June 22, 1862, Constantinople; Bu1wer to Russell, June 24, 1862, Constantinople;
Bu1wer to Russell, June 24, 1862, Istanbul, Correspondence ... ~ Foreign Office to
Longworth, July 7. 1862, London, FO 78/1671: Longworth to Bulwer, July 8,
N8S2~ Ibid - Russel, July 28 and 31, August 1, 1862, Belgrade FO 78/1672.
45 Longworth to Bulwer, August 8, 1862, Belgrade, FO 78/1673.
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had not enough strengh to affect decisions to Serbia's advantage. But
the hesitant stand of Prussian ambassador Baron Werthem made
Moustier shrink to moderacy in his demands. The conference closed on
September 4, 1862, and the representatives of the Guaranteeing Powers
signed a protocol on September 8. It was decided that the fortresses
Soko and Uzice were to be demolished. And a decision of thirty years
before was confirmed whereby Muslims settled outside the fortress
walls were to be evacuated. Guarantees against additional bombard-
ments were given in an unusual manner, with a rejection of a proposal
that Turkey pay for the damages of the last bombardment. Serbia's de-
sires were only partially fulfilled.
The British consul in Belgrade, of course, knew nothing of the
progress of the Conference in Kanlyj a.
*
* *
The Crimean War put Great Britain and Russia on opposite sides.
Britain was on the winning side. Russia, the defeated side, had much to
give up. She had to give over to Britain priority in Constantinople. But
in the Balkans, Russia had what Britain would never achieve: the sym-
pathy of the Slavic Orthodox population and a widely ramified and
successful network of agents. If Britain reigned over Constantinople in
the diplomatic game, Russia spun a thick cobweb in the provinces.
Even if they had no reason to compl ain about a shortage of money, the
British consuls in Belgrade could not have avoided what had happened
to Longworth in 1861: informative isolation. Judging by reports, Long-
worth was unable to establish strong ties with any prominent Serbian
politician in order to obtain information, although Garasanin had once
left him a bag of private confidential letters. The only reliable sources
for British consuls were the Austrian consul and the Turkish pasha.
Thus the reports by British consuls in Belgrade about Russo-Serbian
relations from 1856-1862 are rather meager, at times even verging on
conjecture. But they were able to establish the chief course of the rela-
tions, so Fonblanque was not mistaken when he claimed that "the pol-
icy of Russia IS one of Perturbation en attendant mieux".46 Bulwer
stated the general policy of his country when he arrived in Belgrade af-
ter the Kanlyj a Conference, in October 1862. He admitted that the
Serbs had reason to be unhappy and promised the Serbian government
46 Fonblanque to Clarendon, March 10. 18" 7, Belgrade, FO 78/1278.
114 L)ubodrag P. Ristic
SIncere support in everything that would not present a breach of the
principle of Turkish integrity.
Translated by Dragana Vulicevic
CPIICKO-PYCKl1 OLl:HOCl1 OLl: 1856. Ll:O 1862. rOLl:l1HE
- rrpcMa II'3BCIIITajIIMa 6plITaHcKlIx KOH3yJIa 1I3 Beorpana -
PC3IIMC
O)J,pCJI,6aMa Ilapncxor ~mplBlfor yroaopa 3aKJbYl.JCHOr 30. MapTa 1856.
romme jc. 1I3Mcl)y OCTaHOr. yKIIHYT pycxn nporex'ropar ITa)], KHC:>KCBIIHOM
Cpfinjoxi. Cp6I1ja je. ounxr Yronopoxi, CTaBJbCna non KOJICKTIIBHII npOTCK-
TopaT BeJUIKIIX cnna. MCl)YTlIM, nyrorommra.n YTIIu;aj II I10)J,pmKa pYCIIjc
Cp6njII OCTaBIIJIlI cy JJ,y60Ke TParOBC y rrOJlIITWIKOM MIImJbClhY rrpIJ.TlWIHOr
6poja cprrCKIIX )J,p)l(aBHIIKa II, MO)l()J,a jour )J,y6JbC, ypC3aJIII ocehan,e )J,yra II naue
y CBCCT cpncxor rpabaaaaa II CCJbaKa. Epnrancxa rrOJlIITIIKa o-rynan,a TypCKC
UapCBIIHC je. nax, )J,I1KTIIpaHa 6pIlTanCKIIM KOlI3YJIlIMa y Eeorpany <PoH6JIaIIKY
II JIOHrBOpTy PC3cpBIIcalIOCT rra u nporns.r.eu.e TC)I(lbaMa cpncxor napona II
capamsy ca aycrpnjcxmr Kon3yJIOM II fieorpancxaxr narnoxr. TaKBa rrOJlIITIIKa
HlIKaKO nnje Morna 6IITII 6JlIICKa HII cpncxnxr rrOJlIITWIapIlMa lUI cpncxosi
06WIHOM l.JOBCKy na cy IbIIXOBC )l(CJbC, jour yBCK. 'rpaxcnne OCJIOHau; YPYClIjII n.
)J,OCTa pcl)c, y <PpaHI.J;yCKoj.
360r Tora 6pIlTaHCKII KOlI3YHII y Beorpany IIC caxro na nncy MOL1U )J,a
OCTBapc CBOj CTaJIHIIjIl II cTa6IIJIHuju yrnnaj y cprrCKlIM nOHlITIIl.IKlIM KPY-
rOBIIl\Ia Bcn cy, l.ICCTO. 6IillIl na MYKaMa npannxoxr npaxyn.t.aa,a OCHOBHlIX
noysnamrjax mnpopvanaja. HII <Pon6naHK fill JIoHrBopT HliCY ycnerm na op-
raamyjy MpC:>KY cnrypanx II CIIOco6H1IX capananxa npexo KOjIIX 611 cy3611jaJIII
pyCKII YTlIIJ;aj y Cponja. HIIjC 3aTO IIco6I1l.Jno ITITO cy OBa )J,BojIlu;a )J,lmJIOMaTa,
nOHCKa)J" BII)J,c.1II pyCKC npCTC II TaMO rne ax HlIjC 61IJIO. I1naK, n.nx 0BII
1I3BcUlTaju HOCC )J,0BOJbHO I1oy3)J,aHIIX IIo)J,aTaKa sa crnapan.e cnaxe cpncxe
nOnllTIIl.JKC CU;CHC na xojoj cc pycxn yrnuaj, jour yBCK, BCOMa jacno BUP;lI.
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